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Anyone acquainted with Peter Serracino Inglott’s numerous 
philosophical interests would certainly know of the importance he 
attributed to language as the central and defining feature of humanity . 
His views on language can be found in two texts, namely, Peopled Silence 
(1995) and Beginning Philosophy (1987) . Peopled Silence is structured as a 
textbook and it provides a systematic elaboration of the various aspects 
studied in the philosophy of language (syntax, semantics, pragmatics 
and poetics), while Beginning Philosophy is, strictly speaking, not about 
the philosophy of language but provides a philosophical methodology . 
This text did not receive much attention at the time of its publication, 
with the notable exception of Mario Vella’s critical response, Reflections 
in a Canvas Bag (1989) .
This paper will examine some of the issues raised in the early 
text concerning language, communication and dialogue . Given that 
language is so important to Serracino Inglott’s vision of philosophy 
in particular, and of life in general, I will start 1 . by providing an 
account of the communicative dimension of language; followed by 2 . 
the reconfiguration of this dimension into dialogue; and 3 . conclude 
with his claim that the method of philosophy consists in the analysis 
of language . The purpose of this paper is to provide an exposition of 
Serracino Inglott’s views together with a critical analysis .
Human Communication
Given the ‘linguistic turn’ that has characterized contemporary western 
philosophy, first within Anglo-American philosophy, and later within 
Continental philosophy, it should come as no surprise that Serracino 
Inglott considers the philosophy of language as pivotal to philosophy 
itself . In Beginning Philosophy, it is the pragmatic or communicative 
dimension of language – as opposed to the syntactical (the ordering of 
words), semantic (the relationship between language and the world) or 
the poetic (the literary productions of language) – that is the focus of his 
interest .Serracino Inglott identifies human linguistic communication 
as a marker or sign of human identity, i .e ., what it is that makes us 
human, as opposed to other forms of communication, in this case, 
animals (Serracino Inglott 1987, p .85) . He raises two points:1 . Human 
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linguistic communication is vastly different from other non-linguistic 
forms of communication, and the difference between these two forms 
of communication is that whereas animals communicate with signs that 
are given to them by nature, i .e ., instinctively, and therefore, restricted 
in their communicative potential, human linguistic communication 
is open-ended and therefore allows the creation of an infinite number 
of sentences, despite being governed by rules (Serracino Inglott 1987, 
p .118–9) .1 2 . Human linguistic communication opens up possibilities 
denied to those without language . By virtue of being linguistic animals, 
humans can pretend to be different sorts of creatures; they can even 
pretend to be animals (Serracino Inglott 1987, p .82–3) . The introduction 
of pretence is an allusion to J . L . Austin’s How to do things with Words 
(1975), where he uses the concept of pretending to mark the difference 
between language ‘proper’, i .e ., as it is used in everyday life, and the 
way it is used on stage, i .e ., as pretence (Austin 1975, p .22) . Serracino 
Inglott writes, ‘For pretending, in word or deed, is one of the forms of 
“A saying about Y to B”’ (Serracino Inglott 1987, p .82–3) . As he rightly 
points out, this is not always necessarily a positive feature . Sounding 
very much like Derrida (1988), he claims that the condition that makes 
being realistic and pretending possible can be applied to all speech acts: 
from telling the truth to lying, from complimenting to insulting, from 
expressing one’s sincerity to pretending . When Claude Shannon and 
Warren Weaver introduced the transmission model of communication 
(1949), it was primarily intended to account for communication between 
machines .2 However, because of its simplicity, it was quickly utilized as 
a model of both linguistic and non-linguistic communication . Serracino 
Inglott adopts the transmission model of communication to account 
for human communication defined as the transmission of a message: ‘A 
and B stand for persons, x for signs, and y for reference of the signs, i .e ., 
part of the context in which the process of communication is occurring’ 
(Serracino Inglott 1987, p .73) . This model emphasizes the role of the 
senders and receivers of the message, with the meaning of the message 
as what the speaker intended by the message . The success or failure in 
communication is predicated upon the reception of the same message 
by the hearer . The ultimate goal of this model is that of influencing the 
mental or behavioural state of another person .3 It has been pointed out 
that the weakness of the transmission model of communication is that it 
fails to take into adequate consideration the centrality of the context in 
communicative exchanges . Although Shannon and Weaver claimed that 
the transmission model could be used to solve technical, semantic and 
effectivity problems, the focus of their work could only readily be applied 
to technical problems . While it is possible to measure the transmission of 
information – defined as bits of data – within the technical level so as to 
improve it, the same cannot be said for problems concerning meaning (or 
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effectivity) . The Shannon and Weaver model was not concerned with the 
meaning of data because it did not take the context into consideration . 
N . Katherine Hayles (1979) provides an illuminating example:
Suppose, for example, you are in a windowless office and call to 
ask about the weather . “It’s raining,” I say . On the other hand, if we 
are both standing on a street corner, being drenched by a downpour, 
this same response would have a very different meaning . In the first 
case, I am telling you something you don’t know; in the second, I am 
being ironic (or perhaps moronic) . An information concept that ties 
information to meaning would have to yield two different values for the 
two circumstances, even though the message (“It’s raining”) is the same . 
(Hayles 1979, p .53)
Serracino Inglott’s definition of communication shows his awareness 
of this weakness by specifying that reference entails ‘part of the context 
in which the process of communication is occurring’(Serracino Inglott 
1987, p .73) . On his account, the context supplements the sign in that 
understanding it necessitates an understanding of its context .
But while this addition helps to situate communicative exchanges it 
raises two difficulties:
1 . It suggests that what constitutes a context is self-evident . As several 
theorists have argued, the concept of context is not so transparent or 
obvious as many would like to believe: some (Foucault) have focused 
on institutional contexts (political, religious, academic) and taken into 
account the dynamics of power involved in the communication that 
occurs within such sites .4 Others have focused on the less formal context 
of everyday life by offering an analysis of the necessary conditions for 
communicative action (Habermas) or the conditions presupposing 
speech acts (Searle) . And others still have differentiated between the 
communicative contexts of one-to-one interaction, one-to-many, or 
many-to-many .5
2 . It equivocates between two senses of reference . When Serracino 
Inglott writes that communication entails the use of signs that refer 
to something, the question is ‘what is this something that signs refer 
to?’ The Oxford English Dictionary defines reference as: ‘The action 
or fact of applying words, names, ideas, etc ., to an entity; the relation 
between a word or expression and that which it denotes; the entity or 
entities denoted by a word or expression, a referent (freq . contrasted 
with sense) .’ The emphasis is clearly upon the act of denoting, or referring 
to something, i .e ., what the content is about, the ‘world’ . This account of 
reference fits in squarely with representational theories of language with 
propositions representing the world in a one-to-one relationship . The 
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problem with such models is that they neglect other important purposes 
of communication, such as self-expression, or persuasion .
However, when he elaborates on the concept of reference, 
Serracino Inglott does add ‘part of the context in which the process 
of communication is occurring’ (Serracino Inglott 1987, p .73) This 
sense of reference is different from the sense employed earlier: it is not 
what signs refer to, or are about, but the site of their production . The 
emphasis here is on communication as belonging to a context such that 
a communicative exchange can be partially understood by reference to 
the context of its production . In effect, the context is the frame within 
which the communicative message can be partly – and not completely – 
understood . There is therefore an equivocation in Serracino Inglott’s use 
of the concept of reference: on the one hand, it is used in an ‘external’ 
sense with signs representing and referring to the world, while on the 
other hand, it is also being used ‘internally’ to refer to the context that 
produces signs in the communicative exchange .
At this stage, I want to supplement Serracino Inglott’s transmission 
model of communication with James Carey’s celebrated distinction 
between communication as transmission and communication as 
ritual . In Communication as Culture (2009), Carey argues that the two 
aforementioned models of communication could be found in 19th 
century American culture . However, on account of the innovations in 
technology, the transmission view of communication edged out the ritual 
model and has dominated theories of communication . This domination 
continues to be pervasive in contemporary society where, to this day, 
it is the lexicon of this model  – ‘sending’, ‘receiving’, ‘transmitting’, 
‘imparting’ – that is constantly being reiterated . Originally this concept 
of communication included both the transportation of people or goods 
and the imparting of information . In this formulation, power and 
control could be exercized over large distances in relatively quick time . 
The introduction of the telegraph re-configured communication so that 
the concept no longer included that of people or goods but solely of 
information . Despite this reconfiguration, communication still remained 
a process ‘whereby messages [were] transmitted and distributed in space 
for the control of distance and people’ (Carey 2009, p .19) .
While the overcoming of distance is the prerogative of the transmission 
model, with the ritual account the temporal dimension is accentuated . 
The latter confirms and consolidates the identity of the community over 
time as it re-iterates the shared beliefs of the community . This is why 
the concepts subsumed under the ritual model of communication  – 
‘sharing’, ‘participation’, ‘association’, etc . – are associated with those of 
communication as ‘community’ and ‘communion’ .
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The concept of ritual is derived from the domain of religion, in 
particular, from the religion that emphasizes praying, changing and 
ceremony  – as opposed to sermon, instruction and admonition . 
Whether religious or not, the purpose of ritual remains that of providing 
a meaningful backdrop, i .e ., a cultural basis within which human action 
can take place . In a very obvious sense, a culture sets the boundaries for 
what is meaningful and permitted within a community . Carey compares 
the two models of communication as these are applied to the analysis 
of newspapers . With the transmission view of communication the 
newspaper functions as a tool that transmits information, entertainment 
(or both) across large distances . The questions that arise in studies on 
newspapers concern their ‘effects’ upon audiences, whether they help 
‘integrate’ society, whether they ‘promote’ personalities . The analysis 
conducted in the search for answers to these questions are typically 
‘mechanical’ . On the other hand, when applying the ritual view of 
communication to newspapers, different questions are asked . A ritualistic 
analysis attempts to understand a newspaper’s ‘presentation of reality’ 
with the various forces engaged in conflict . Carey writes, ‘[t]he mode here 
is not that of information acquisition, though such acquisition occurs, 
but of dramatic action in which the reader joins a world of contending 
forces as an observer at a play’ (Carey 2009, p .17) .
However, while Carey argues for the ritual model of communication, 
he does not deny the continuing role of the transmission model, but 
argues that it should be embedded within the broader concept of the 
ritual . My purpose here has been to show that it is only by re-configuring 
communication in the manner of Carey, that Serracino Inglott’s 
undeveloped claim that ‘fulfillment cannot be achieved except when 
communication flows into communion’ (Serracino Inglott 1987, p .94) 
can be attained .
Philosophy as Dialogue
Serracino Inglott’s model of communication introduces the concept of 
feedback as inherent to the communicative process . And given that his 
model of communication privileges speech as the medium of exchange, 
feedback is configured as a dialogical exchange (Serracino Inglott 1987, 
p .71) . However, it should be pointed out that while Serracino Inglott 
favours dialogue as a model of human communication, he further adds 
that it is only ‘one basic kind’ of communication, and that cannot even be 
considered as the only type of human communication . In other words, he 
acknowledges the various modes of non-verbal communication, human 
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(gestural, bodily, proxemic) and non-human (as in the case of animals 
and machines or computers) .6
This qualification comes across as strained in that the text as a whole 
emphasizes the centrality of language as a way to understanding human 
existence . It would not be an exaggeration to say that Serracino Inglott 
accepts an essentialist definition of humanity as linguistic animals 
with dialogue as the actualization of their innate linguistic capabilities . 
Whatever the case may be, even if dialogue is only one out of the many 
forms of communication possible to humans, it is certainly true both 
that the other forms of communication are linguistically mediated and 
that it still seems to have a privileged position when accounting for 
human communication .
Not everyone agrees with the valourization of dialogue as central to 
an understanding of human communication . A case in point is Durham 
Peters, who, in ‘Communication as Dissemination’ (2006) argues for a 
re-configuration of communication theory away from its bias towards 
human communication, and specifically, towards the idealization 
of dialogue . Instead, he proposes a model of communication as 
dissemination that is more inclusive (human and non-human) in scope .
Peters ‘downplays exchange or reciprocity as the defining criterion of 
communication’ (Peters 2006, p .212) and theorizes dissemination as the 
‘scattering’ of meaning . Communicative acts might be sent but whether, 
and by whom, they are received is a question of probability rather than 
of certainty as feedback theories seem to assume . While the concept of 
feedback fits in well with theories that explain communication between 
machines, reciprocity or reciprocal exchange is favored by those interested 
in human communication, especially when it is framed as dialogical 
exchange . However, Peters reminds us that ‘[f]ace-to-face speech 
genres are not always dialogical – think of interrogations or scolding’ 
(Peters 2006, p .212) . It is mistaken, therefore, on his account, to assume 
that dialogue is the model of human communication . And while it is 
valourized by certain philosophers, it is grounded in the assumption that 
speakers and hearers possess a ‘stable ego-identity’ or ‘integrated egos’ . 
The dialogical model assumes two solitary and fully developed ‘poles’ 
of communication . Dissemination, ‘in contrast, models communication 
for creatures that emit weak, pathetic signals – infants, pets, the dead, 
most of us, most of the time’ (Peters 2006, p .218) .
Given the centrality of language to human existence, Serracino Inglott 
argues that the starting point of philosophy should be the analysis of 
language .7 This claim is justified on the ground that there is a distinction 
between first and second order subjects . A first order subject is one that 
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involves an action or a doing (an artist painting or a surgeon operating), 
while a second order subject (philosophy) involves an examination of the 
meaning and value of those actions (‘what is art?’ or ‘what is life?’) . The 
first and second order distinction is also applied to linguistic actions: 
philosophical analysis occurs when the use of dialogue in everyday 
communication is suspended and the focus shifts to the way language is 
being used to communicate a meaning . The starting point of philosophy 
entails a consideration of ‘what it is to say something about something 
to someone’ (Serracino Inglott 1987, p .72) . This, in short, is the point of 
departure for anyone wishing to engage in philosophical reflection .
However, dialogue is transformed into a philosophical practice with 
the introduction of questioning (Serracino Inglott, 1987, p .71) . The 
notion of the philosopher as persistently asking questions is probably 
engrained in the mind of the general public, but one should differentiate 
between this notion of asking questions, and the view Serracino Inglott 
is arguing for .
The first approach is that of, for example, Socrates who asked questions 
in order to arrive at a definition of a particular concept (for example, the 
concept of love in the Symposium) . Thus, for Socrates, doing philosophy 
entailed answering the question, ‘what is x (say, love)?’ because by finding 
the right definition one identified the necessary qualities of the concept . 
A more contemporary view of the concept of dialogue or conversation as 
structured along the ‘logic of question and answer’ is H . G . Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics . While hermeneutics has been traditionally 
associated with textual interpretation, Gadamer argues (following 
Heidegger’s cue) that all human understanding is interpretative and 
that interpretation should involve the horizon of the interpreter and the 
horizon of the other . He frames this interaction as a process of question 
and answer that produces a new interpretation, or what he calls a ‘fusion 
of horizons’ .
The second approach advocated by Serracino Inglott and the branch 
of analytic philosophy that he subscribed to involved asking questions 
about the way words are used in everyday life . When he writes that 
philosophy is a ‘dialogue about dialogue’ it is clear that he considers the 
starting point of philosophy as that of linguistic analysis, an approach 
indebted to J . L . Austin, who in ‘A Plea for Excuses’ (Austin 1979, 
pp .175–204), argued that philosophers should examine ‘what we should 
say when, and so why and what we should mean by it .’ Serracino Inglott 
justifies his choice of philosophical method on the grounds that if it is 
language that makes us uniquely human, then asking questions about 
our everyday language use should be the starting point of philosophy . 
But as he is at pains to point out, philosophy is not ‘ just about words’ 
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(Serracino Inglott 1987, p .56): the point of linguistic analysis is to enable 
us to live fuller and more meaningful lives since our understanding of 
what is at stake is clearer .
However, while asking questions is a necessary condition for 
philosophical practice, it is evidently not a sufficient one . Clearly, one 
can ask about the weather or someone’s health, without being interested 
in a philosophical analysis of the weather or health . Serracino Inglott 
supplements dialogical questioning with an overview of what he considers 
the content or subject matter of philosophy, an overview that is reductive 
and derived from the history of philosophy . These areas include: the 
study of language itself, i .e ., meta-language, the logical consistency and 
foundations of the natural sciences, the limits of the natural sciences and 
the possibility of talking about those domains that go beyond the natural 
sciences, metaphysics, ethics (including politics as a branch of ethics), 
and the history of philosophy (Serracino Inglott 1987, p . 53–7) .
Serracino Inglott shows an overriding concern with the limits or 
boundaries, not only of the natural sciences, but also of philosophy . The 
limits of what can be philosophically spoken about point indirectly to 
the other of philosophy . Utilizing Wittgenstein’s concept of language 
games, Serracino Inglott argues that the limitations of one language 
game might be supplemented by opening up to another language game . 
The limitations to the questions that philosophy can answer might lead 
to the natural sciences .
What are the limitations of philosophy that Serracino Inglott 
figuratively calls, ‘monsters’? There are two and they are both related to 
the functioning of language as a medium for communication:
1 . Externally: the ‘monsters’ here are death and individuality . It 
is worth recalling that for the ancient Greeks, given that a ‘proper’ 
language had to be able to represent world rationally, then there was no 
place for the ‘monsters’ of death and individuality since the language 
of philosophy or of science were unable to explain them rationally 
(Serracino Inglott 1987, p .79) . It would seem that what philosophy and 
the natural sciences have in common is an inability to explain the 
phenomenon of death as a necessary accident and the phenomenon of 
the person as a universal singularity . However, it is the inexplicability 
of death that receives sustained treatment in Beginning Philosophy, and 
Serracino Inglott argues that both i . the inability of the natural sciences 
to explain the ‘monstrosity’ of death shows their limitations; and ii . the 
inability of philosophy to explain the limits of the natural sciences (given 
philosophy’s role as a second-order discipline) is a sign that perhaps 
other languages – of myth or religion – might be able to provide a better 
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understanding of these ‘monsters’ (Serracino Inglott 1987, p .80) . Faced 
with these phenomena, philosophy and the natural sciences are reaching 
the limits of their respective languages .
2 . Internally: the internal monsters are those features that are an 
inherent part of language as a tool for communication but which 
can generate paradoxes or contradictions . As a result they prevent 
communication – defined in terms of the successful transmission of a 
message from A to B – from being realized . Serracino Inglott lists several 
of these well known paradoxes (Serracino Inglott 1987, pp .98–114) but 
despite these ‘threats’ to dialogue as a communicative medium he 
provides rational solutions for them .
There is, therefore, an asymmetry in the relationship between 
philosophy and what the natural sciences can communicate about, and 
these ‘monsters’ . On the one hand, the external ‘monsters’ of death and 
individuality exceed the limits of philosophy and the natural sciences 
reducing them to silence, while on the other hand, the internal ‘monsters’ 
can be resolved rationally but their presence is an inherent part of the 
linguistic communicative system .8
A number of objections can be raised against Serracino Inglott’s 
valourization of philosophy as dialogue . This image of philosophy as 
a face-to-face dialogue between two persons examining instances of 
everyday language use is a romanticized idealization of philosophy . For 
a start, this view entails what is known as a ‘performative contradiction’ 
in that Beginning Philosophy is a written text suggesting that philosophy 
should be dialogical . In other words, what is being said and what is being 
done are opposed to each other . In addition, if one wanted to engage in 
conceptual analysis by examining instances of everyday language use, 
it would be perfectly possible to do so without dialogue . In fact, most 
academic philosophy is written and published, and when it is constructed 
in a dialogue form it has the feeling of being contrived and artificial .
One possible response to this objection is that the word ‘dialogue’ is 
being used ‘figuratively’ in a fashion similar to the way Gadamer uses it 
in Truth and Method (1989), i .e ., to imaginatively reconstruct the voice 
of the other . The thesis he is proposing is that textual interpretation 
involves allowing the text to have a voice, because it still (especially if it is 
a classical text) has something to teach us . By re-asserting the role of the 
text as a crucial ‘pole’ in the process of interpretation, Gadamer counters 
the prevailing tendency in contemporary culture to focus solely on the 
subjective pole of interpretation . While the rejection of subjectivism is 
something, I think, Serracino Inglott would support, it is not the issue 
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in his valourization of dialogue as the speech genre most suited to 
philosophy .
It would seem that the reasons for this valourization are similar to 
some of the reasons that Socrates offers for the defense of speech in 
the Phaedrus, a defense that is subjected to Derrida’s deconstructive 
critique in Dissemination (1981) . Utilizing Derrida’s insights one might 
argue that Serracino Inglott’s defence of the dialogue is grounded in 
the ‘metaphysics of presence’ where face-to-face interaction entails the 
presence of the two speakers who can respond (‘feedback) to each other’s 
questions and answers with the dialogue reaching an end when the 
truth is reached . A Derridean critique of dialogue as presence reveals 
that the presence that is expressed in dialogical interaction is actually 
made possible by absence, a feature that is attributed to writing . In other 
words, the conditions that make speech possible are the same as the 
conditions that make writing possible: both are marked by difference 
and absence . Derrida concludes that dialogue is an effect of, or product 
of, a generalized form of writing (i .e ., grammatology), that accounts for 
all forms of communication .
From this short exposition of Serracino Inglott’s views on 
communication, dialogue and philosophy, it is evident that Beginning 
Philosophy serves as a rich platform of ideas that can await further 
examination . And to do justice to the legacy of Serracino Inglott requires, 
in my view, approaching these ideas not subserviently, but by combining 
exposition with critique .
In my analysis of Serracino Inglott’s views on communication, 
dialogue and the method of philosophical analysis, I have first highlighted 
the centrality of language in his philosophy, and followed this with an 
exposition and evaluation of the transmission model of communication; 
in the final part, I elaborated upon and critiqued the idealized model of 
philosophy as entailing a dialogue about dialogue .
Endnotes
1 See Peopled Silence, p.36
2 The chief concern of Shannon and Weaver was with the efficiency of the channels 
of communication, notably telephone cables and radio waves. They wanted to 
explain both how to send the maximum amount of information over a channel and 
how to measure the capacity of a channel.
3 Fiske calls this model the ‘process model’ and opposes it to the semiotic model 
that sees communication as the production and exchange of meanings. This model 
emphasizes the social or communal aspects of communication with a message 
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generating a meaning in the interaction between texts, producers/readers and the 
external world.
4 Vella points out that the problem with Serracino Inglott’s valourization of context 
is too abstract, failing to take into account concrete political positions (p.2).
5 G. Thomas Goodnight, ‘The Engagements of Communication: Jurgen Habermas 
on Discourse, Critical Reason, and Controversy’, p.92, in Perspectives on the 
Philosophy of Communication.
6 See Umberto Eco’s distinction between communication and signification. In 
A Theory of Semiotics argues for a broader conception of communication, a 
conception that excludes the human as a starting point in the understanding of 
communication. Eco distinguishes between communication as a process that 
takes place between machines from communication that occurs when humans 
intervene, i.e., when meaning is introduced. Two computers communicating do 
not understand the meaning of what they are doing, but once the human element is 
introduced communication is transformed into signification.
7 Serracino Inglott writes, ‘The SPoPH is the beginning of learning the language of 
philosophy, beginning to learn how to talk with philosophers, […]’ (p.78).
8 In Peopled Silence, Serracino Inglott writes about one type of monster, i.e., 
paradoxes: ‘[t]he central importance of the paradox in the philosophy of language 
is due to its being the prototype of one of the basic, inherent threats to which any 
rational account of language is heir to […]’(p.143).
